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Abstract. In most times and places, women on average marry men who are older
than themselves. We propose a partial explanation for this difference and for why it is
diminishing. In a society where the economic roles of males are more varied and specialized
than the roles of females, it may be that the relative desirability of females as marriage
partners becomes evident at an earlier age for females than it does for males. We study an
equilibrium model in which the males who regard their prospects as unusually good choose
to wait until their economic success is revealed before choosing a bride. In equilibrium,
the most desirable young females choose successful older males. Young males who do not
believe that time will not treat them kindly will offer to marry at a young age. Although
they are aware that young males available for marriage are no bargain, the less desirable
young females will be offered no better option than the lottery presented by marrying a
young male. We show the existence of equilibrium for models of this type and explore the
properties of equilibrium.
In most times and places, women, on average, marry men who are older than them-
selves. A recent United Nations study
1 reports the average age of marriage
2 for each sex
for more than 90 countries over the time interval between 1950 and 1985. In every country
and in every time period reported, the mean age at marriage of males exceeded that of
females. The smallest difference in mean ages was 1 year (Ireland) and the largest differ-
ence was 10.9 years (Mali). In 1985 in the United States, the difference was 1.9 years, in
Western Europe about 2.5 years, and in Southern and Eastern Europe about 3.5 years. In
Japan the difference was 3.7 years, in India, nearly 5 years and in the Middle East, about
4 years. In the Caribbean the age gap is about 5 years, in Central America, about 4 years
and in South America, between 2 and 3 years In African countries, this gap ranges between
5 and 10 years. In most countries, the age difference between the sexes at marriage has
diminished substantially 1950 to 1985, but nowhere has it disappeared altogether.
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In this paper we propose a partial explanation for this difference, for why it is dimin-
ishing over time, and for why it tends to be greater in traditional societies than in modern
societies. We suggest that the difference between the marriage ages of males and females
stems from the different economic roles of males and females and from a difference in the
age at which about one's "quality" as a possible marriage partner becomes apparent.
If male economic roles are relatively varied and specialized, it is likely that relevant
information about a male's economic capabilities is revealed only gradually after he has
spent time in the work force. In contrast, for a female who is confined to traditional roles,
once she has reached physical maturity, the passage of time may add little information
about her capabilities in these roles.4
We assume that, other things being equal, both sexes prefer early marriage to late
marriage. But a male who expects to prosper may gain by delaying marriage until the
evidence of his success allows him to attract one of the more desirable females. Females, on
Patterns of First Marriage: Timing and Prevalence (1990)
2 The average computed is the "singulate mean age at marriage". This statistic estimates the average
number of years spent in the single state by those who marry before age 50, and is computed from census
statistics on the proportion of the population who have never married in each age group. See Iajnal (1953)
(or details.
3 In 72 of the 91 countries listed in Tables 1-4, the age gap decreased and in 14 countries the gap
increased. Exceptions to this pattern are Japan, Germany, and several countries in Southern and Eastern
Europe.
4 To be sure, more information about her childbearing ability becomes available as she actually bears
children, but we assume that she and her partner must agree to a lifetime marriage before she begins to
reproduce.
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the other hand, have little to gain by postponing marriage. In equilibrium, females marry
young, but the more desirable females marry successful older males and the less desirable
females marry young males who believe their prospects for economic success are not very
good.
1. Preferences, Information, and the Distribution of Quality
Consider a population of constant size, in which people are born, marry, and die. In every
year, equal numbers of males and females reach maturity. People can choose to marry
either in the first or the second year of maturity. Those who marry in the first year are
said to marry at Age 1 and those who marry in the second year of maturity are said to
marry at Age 2. Marriages are monogamous and there is no divorce or remarriage.
Some people are more desirable marriage partners than others. Assume that mem-
bers of each sex agree in their rankings of the opposite sex. Indeed, let us make the
stronger assumption that persons of each sex have identical von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility functions over lotteries in which their marriage partners are randomly selected from
the opposite sex. Let zi be the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility that males assign to
the prospect of marrying person female i and let yi be the von Neumann-Morgenstern
utility that females assign to the prospect of marrying male i. We will call xi or yi, the
"quality" of individual i. The quality of females is distributed over an interval [L,, U9]
with a cumulative distribution function, F,(x), and the quality of males is distributed over
an interval [Lb, Ub] with a c. d. f. , Fb(y). Other things being equal, everyone would prefer
marrying at Age 1 to marrying at Age 2. The utility cost of delaying marriage from Age
1 to Age 2 is cb for males and c9 for females. Marrying even the least desirable member of
the opposite sex is preferred to the prospect of remaining single.'
Full information about the quality of each female is publicly known she reaches Age
1. The quality of a male becomes public information only when he reaches Age 2. At
Age 1, a male knows how well he will turn out,6 but to the females, his prospects are
indistinguishable from those of his contemporaries, except that his choice of when to marry
may act as a signal of quality.
2. Marriage and Equilibrium
We model the marriage market as a game of incomplete information in which people choose
to marry either at Age 1 or Age 2. Members of each generation make simultaneous choices
s This assumption involves no real loss of generality. If there are persons so disagreeable that the
prospect of being married to them is worse than remaining single, these persons will have no bearing on
the outcomes and the model as formulated can be applied to the population that remains after excluding
them.
6 Formally, this model will apply if young males are not certain about how well they will turn out, but
have some private information about their prospects. In this case, y; can be interpreted as i's expectaison
of his quality in period 2.
about when to marry, without observing the choices made by their contemporaries. Thus
each individual believes that changing his or her decision about when to marry will not
alter the choices made by contemporaries. Given all of the individual choices of when to
marry, the "payoff" to each individual is determined by a matching rule applied to the set
of people who choose to marry in each time period. The population of males who choose
to marry in any period is matched to the population of females who choose to marry in
the same period in order of corresponding expected quality.
If the quality of all individuals in the marriage market were public information, then this
matching would be entirely straightforward. The most desirable male would be matched
to the most desirable female, the second most desirable male to the second most desirable
female, and so on until the supply of persons of at least one sex has been exhausted. If the
number of available persons of one sex exceeds that of the other, this process leaves some
people from the "lower tail" of the quality distribution unmatched. Unmatched persons of
Age 1 may reappear in the marriage market in the next period.
The actual matching rule is complicated by the fact that males of Age I are indistin-
guishable to females and hence are of equal expected quality. Applying the principle of
matching by corresponding rank leads to the following assignment. At time period, t, the
best unmarried male of Age 2 will be matched to the best female who chooses to marry at
time t, the second best unmarried male will marry the second best unmarried female and
so on until the supply of males whose quality exceeds the average of available Age 1 males
is exhausted.
The assignment of partners for the remainder of the population follows directly from
the principal of matching by corresponding rank and from the fact that females cannot
distinguish between males who choose to marry at Age 1.
Let Nm(t) be the number of Age 1 males who choose to marry at time t. Let N1(t)
be the numbers of females who choose to marry at time t and who are not matched to a
male of who is better than the a random draw from the available Age 1 males. There are
three possible cases.
(1) If Nm(t) = Nj(t), then each of the males who chose to marry at Age 1 will be randomly
assigned a partner from the set of N1 (t) females who want to marry in this period and
are not already taken by an Age 2 male.
(2) If Nm(t) < N1 (t), then the best N,,,(t) of the N1 (t) available females will be randomly
matched to the males of Age 1. The remaining N1 (t) - Nm(t) females will be matched
in order of corresponding quality with any remaining males of Age 2 who are of lower
quality than the average available male of Age 1. Females left over at the end of this
process will be left unmatched. Those who are of Age 1 may reenter the marriage
market in the next period at Age 2.
(3) If Nn(t) > Nf(t), then a random draw of N1 (t) males from the set of available males
of Age 1 will be paired with the NI(t) females who are available and have not been
matched with a male of higher quality. Males who chose to marry at Age 1 but did not
receive partners in the random assignment will be able to reenter marriage market in
2 3
the next period at Age 2.
With this set of matching rules, the assignment among the set of people who choose
to marry in any given year has the core or stable marriage assignment property. Gale and
Shapley (1962), Shapley and Shubik (1972).' That is to say, no two people of opposite
sexes who marry in the same year would both get higher expected utility from marrying
each other than they do from their actual choices.
Of course, specifying the matching rules for those who choose to marry in. the same
period does not constitute a full description of equilibrium, since the set of people who
are in the marriage pool in any year depends on choices that individuals make about their
age of marriage. We define equilibrium as a choice of age at marriage for each individual
in each time period such that each person's choice of whether to marry at Age 1 or Age
2 maximizes his or her expected utility, given the choices of all other individuals." The
choices of others determine the quality distribution in the marriage pool in each year and
thus determine the payoffs from marrying at Age 1 or Age 2. Given our definition of
equilibrium, it will have to be that in equilibrium nobody who marries at Age 1 would
have a higher expected payoff from waiting to marry at Age 2 and nobody who marries at
Age 2 would have a higher expected payoff by marrying at Age 1.
Study of this model is much simplified by the fact that equilibrium will always have
the following property.
Proposition 1. At any time t, the set of males who choose to wait until Age 2 to marry
will be an "upper tail" of the quality distribution. That is, a set of the form {yjy > y)
for some y= E [La, U6].-
Proof: Consider two males, born at the same time, of quality y' and y where y' > y. If
these males both marry at Age 1, then they face the same lottery and their expected payoff
will be the same. If they wait until Age 2 to marry, then the male of quality y' will be
matched to a female whose quality is at least as great as the quality of the female matched
to the male of quality y. From this it follows that if it is worthwhile for a male of quality
y to wait until Age 2 to marry, any male of higher quality than y will find it worthwhile
to wait. I
3. Long-Run Stationary Equilibrium
Since we have assumed that the number of persons born in each year is constant and the
quality distributions and preferences are the same in each generation, we can hope to find
7 For further references as well as a masterful treatment of this subject, see Roth and Sotomayor (1990).
8 This is a Bayesian equilibrium of an agreeably simple nature. In this model, we do not have to wonder
what inferences are to be drawn about a player's type if he or she deviates from equilibrium behavior. By
the time that a deviation is observed by another player, the deviator will have reached Age 2. The type
of every Age 2 person is common knowledge, so there is no mystery in how to regard someone who has in
the past deviated from equilibrium strategies.
a long-run stationary equilibrium, in which each generation behaves in exactly the same
way as all preceding generations.
It turns out that in long-run equilibrium, all females marry at Age 1. There is a
threshold level of quality, y*, such that in each time period, males of higher quality than
y* choose to marry at Age 2 and males of lower quality choose to marry at Age 1. The
highest quality male from a generation will marry at Age 2 to the highest quality female
from the next younger generation. The second highest quality male will marry at Age 2
to the second highest quality female of Age 1, and so on until the threshold quality y* is
reached. Males of quality lower than y* will choose to marry at Age 1 and will receive a
random assignment from the set of Age 1 females who were not of sufficiently high quality
to be matched with the available males of Age 2.
In order to describe long-run equilibrium more explicitly, it is useful to define a "match-
ing function" g such that x = g(y) means that a female of quality x has the same or-
dinal rank among females as a male of quality y has among males. Thus g(z) is the
(unique) solution to the equation F(z) = Fg(g(z)). It will also be useful to have a no-
tation pb(y) for the quality of the "average male who is no better than a male of quality
y" and a similar notation p,(y) for females. Formally, pb(y) = fJ zdFb(z)/F(y) and
Pg(y) = f , zdFg(z)/F,(y).
Suppose that in every generation, males of higher quality than y* choose to wait until
Age 2 to marry, that all males of quality lower than y* choose to marry at Age 1 and
that all females choose to marry at Age 1. Then in every generation, all females of quality
higher than g(y*) will be matched to males of Age 2. Males who choose to marry at Age
1 will be matched with a random draw from the set of females of Age 1. The expected
quality of a random draw from this set is p,(g(y*)). If he waits to marry at Age 2, a male
who is of the threshold quality y* will be matched with a female of corresponding quality
g(y*), and allowing for the cost of waiting, his utility will be g(y*)-ca. A male of threshold
quality will be just indifferent between marrying at Age 1 and at Age 2. Therefore it must
be that
p,(gCy*)) = g(y ) - cb. (1)
We can fully characterize long-run stationary equilibrium with the following result.
Proposition 2. If y* e [Lb, UbJ satisfies Equation 1, then there is a long-run stationary
equilibrium such that in every generation, each male of quality y > y* marries at Age 2
to a female of Age 1 whose quality is g(y) and each male of quality y < y* marries at Age
1 to a female randomly selected from the set of females in his own generation of quality
x < g(y*). Conversely every long-run stationary equilibrium is of this type.
Proof: The assertion that the proposed arrangement is an equilibrium will be demon-
strated if we can show that no individual can gain by deviating from the proposed equi-
librium strategy. Consider a male of quality y > y*. If he chooses to marry at Age 2, he
will be matched to a female of quality g(y) and his payoff will be g(y) - cb. If he chooses
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to marry at Age 1, he will have an expected payoff of p,(g(y*)).9 Since g is an increasing
function of y, it follows from Equation 1 that he cannot gain by marrying at Age 1 rather
than at Age 2.
Consider a male of quality y < y*. If he marries at Age 1, he will have a random draw
from the set of females of quality less than g(y*) and his expected payoff will be p,(g(y*)).
If he waits until Age 2 to marry, then his quality will be common knowledge. All of the
males from his own generation of quality y > y* will be in the marriage pool at this time
and will be matched to all of the Age 1 females of quality x > g(y*). Therefore his payoff
from marrying at Age 2 will be smaller than g(y*) - cb. From Equation 1, it follows that
he cannot gain by marrying at Age 2 rather than at Age 1.
Consider any female. If she deviates from the strategy of marrying at Age 1, the
expected quality of her partner will be no higher than the expected quality she can get
at Age 1.10 Since waiting is costly, she would not gain from choosing to marry at Age 2
rather than at Age 1.
We have shown that if y* satisfies Equation 1, no person can gain by deviating from the
proposed equilibrium strategies. All that remains is to show that every long-run stationary
equilibrium is of the type described in this proposition. From Proposition 1, it follows that
in any equilibrium,, the set of males divides into an upper quality interval who marry at
Age 2 and a lower quality interval who marry at Age 1. If equilibrium is to be stationary,
then the threshold quality at which these groups divide must be some constant y* If
the pool of available males is the same in every period, then (since waiting is costly) it
can never be worthwhile for females to choose to marry at Age 2 rather than at Age 1.
Therefore in equilibrium all females must marry at Age 1. Finally it is straightforward to
verify that males better than y* will choose marriage at Age 2 and males worse than y*
will choose marriage at Age 1 only if Equation 1 is satisfied. I
4. Existence and Uniqueness of Long-run Equilibrium
The questions of existence and uniqueness of long-run equilibrium reduce to the question
of whether Equation 1 has a solution and whether that solution is unique. Let us define
the difference between a male or female's own quality, z, and the quality of the average
male or female who is no better than z. Let Eb(z) = z - pb(z) and 69(z) = 2z- p9(z). Then
9 Since we have assumed that people in the same generation choose their age of marriage simultaneously,
his choice to marry at Age 1 will not change the set of females who choose to marry at Age 1, nor will it
change the set of unmarried Age 2 males. Therefore the pool of females who are available to marry Age I
males does not change in response to his decision to marry at Age 1. It follows that the expected payoff
from marrying at age I remains y 9(g(y*)) whether or not he chooses to marry at Age 1.
10 There is a slight complication. If she decided to delay marriage, then when her age is 1, the number
of males in the marriage market would exceed the number of females by 1. Therefore a randomly selected
male who chose to marry at Age 1 would not find a mate. He would reappear in the marriage market in
the next year. But the addition of a randomly selected male from the set of males of quality y < y* will
not improve the expected quality assignment for any female who waits until the next period to marry.
Equation 1 is equivalent to
6,(g(y*)) = Cb. (2)
The following two assumptions will be sufficient for the existence and uniqueness, re-
spectively of a solution to Equations 1 and 2.
Assumption 1. The distribution function for quality of each sex is continuous and the
difference between the quality of the most desirable female and the average quality of
females exceeds the cost, cb, to a male of waiting to marry at Age 2.
Assumption 2. The function, 6,(x), (which is the difference between x and the average
quality of females worse than x) is a monotone increasing function of x.
Proposition 3. If Assumption 1 holds, then there exists at least one long-run stationary
state equilibrium where y* solves Equation 1.
Proof: By Assumption 1, 5(U,) > cb. From the definition of the function 6(), it follows
that 6(L9 ) = 0 < c&. The function 6(x) inherits continuity from the distribution function
for x. Therefore from the intermediate value theorem, there must be at least one solution,
x*, to the equation 6(x*) = cb. Let y* = g 1(x*). Then 6 (g(y*)) = cb. Therefore there
exists a solution to Equations 1 and 2. From Proposition 2, it follows that there exists a
long-run stationary equilibrium. 3I
Proposition 4. If Assumption 2 holds, then any long-run stationary equilibrium is unique.
Proof:
From Assumption 2 and the monotonicity of g, it must be that 69(g(y)) - cb is a
monotonic increasing function of y and hence there can be only one y* for which S(g(y*)) =
e. From Proposition 2 it follows that every long-run stationary equilibrium must satisfy
this equation. I
An Example
Suppose that the quality of females is uniformly distributed on an interval [0, a] and the
quality of males is uniformly distributed on the interval [0, b]. Then the function that maps
males to females of corresponding quality rank is g(y) = ly. For the uniform distribution,
the average quality of females worse than x is just x/2. Thus we have i(x) = x/2
and 6,(z) = x - p9 (x) = x/2. We see that 6,(x) is an increasing function of x, so
that Assumption 3 is satisfied. In fact we can readily solve for the unique equilibrium.
The equilibrium condition, 6,(g(y*)) = c1 will be satisfied if ny* = c& or equivalently if
y* =2-. Therefore if 0 < 2c < a, there will exist a unique solution for y* in the interval
(0, b). In long-run equilibrium all males of quality y < y* = -6cb will choose to marry at
Age 1. Males who marry at Age 1 will get a random draw from the population of females
of Age 1 whose quality is lower than g(y*) = 2c,. The expected payoff of a draw from
this pool will then be cb. If a male of quality y* marries at Age 2, he will be paired with
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a female of quality g(y*) = 2cb, but he has to bear the cost of waiting until Age 2. His
utility payoff from waiting is 2cb - cb = cb, which is the same as the payoff from marrying
at Age 1. Females of quality x > 2cb, will marry Age 2 males of quality b". Females of
quality x < 2cb will get a random draw from the population of males who choose to marry
at Age 1.
5. Log Concavity and Uniqueness of Equilibrium
As we have shown, monotonicity of the function 6,(z) is sufficient for the uniqueness
of equilibrium." We found that if the quality of females is uniformly distributed, then
6,(x) is strictly monotone increasing. It would be interesting to know more generally, what
probability distributions have this property. It happens that there is a clearcut and elegant
answer to this question.
The following lemma takes a first step toward this answer.
Lemma 1. Let F(x) be a cumulative distribution function defined on an interval [L, UJ.
Where G(x) = f4' F(t)dt and 6(x) = x - f" t dt, the function 6(x) is monotone in-
creasing if and only if G(x)/G'(x) is monotone increasing.
Proof: Integrate the expression for 6(x) by parts. 1
Definition. A function f : R" -+ R+ is log concave on the interval [a, b] if log f is a
concave function on [a, b].
By simple calculus, a twice differentiable function f(x) will be log concave if and only if
f'(x)/f(x) is a decreasing function of f. Therefore we notice that the function G(x)/G'(x)
is monotone increasing if and only if G(x) is a log concave function. This enables us to
make the following observation.
Remark 1. The function 6(x) monotone increasing if and only if G(x) is log concave.
In general it is not easy to verify directly whether common probability distributions
have the property that, G(x), the integral of the cumulative distribution function is log con-
cave. Most of the familiar distributions have relatively simple closed-form density functions
f(x), but usually the cumulative distribution functions F(x) and a fortiori the integrals
of the cumulative density functions G(x) do not have known closed form expressions.
As it happens, the property of log concavity is inherited from density functions by the
corresponding cumulative distribution functions and from c.d.f.'s by their integrals. This
is result has appeared in several places in the literature on operations research, statistics
and economics. (See, for example, Prekova (1973), Pratt (1981), Goldberger (1983), Flinn
and Heckman (1983), Caplin and Nalebuff (1988), and Dierker (1989).) The simple proof
presented here is based on Dierker's proof of the same proposition.
1 If 6,(z) is not monotonic there will be multiple solutions to Equation 1 for at least some values of c&.
Lemma 2. If a function f(x) is differentiable and log concave on [a, b], then the function
F(x) = fa f(t)dt is also log concave on [a, b].
Proof. By elementary calculus, F(x) will be log concave if 0 > (F'(x)/F(x)) = f'(x)F(x) - f(x)
If f is log concave, then also by elementary calculus, it must be that for x < t, f'(x)/f(x)
f'(t)/f(t). Therefore, for all s E [a, b],
f'(x)F( =f'(x) J *j f't
f (x) x= ) ftdt<j f(t)dt
fAx) f(x) . -,ft
But
Therefore
j f = f'(t)dt = f(x) - 1(a).
f(x)
and hence 0 > f'(x)F(x) - f(x)2 . Therefore F(x) is log concave. I
Applying Lemma 2 to a probability density function f and then once again to its
integral F, we see that if f is log concave, then F is log concave and so also is G, where
G is the integral of the probability density function. This fact, together with Remark 1,
allows us to claim the following.
Lemma 3. If the density function f(x) is differentiable and log concave on [a, b], then the
function 6(x) is monotone increasing in x.
Lemma 3 is very useful because it is possible to verify by simple calculations that
many common probability distributions have log concave density functions. Consider, for
example the standard normal distribution. This distribution has In f(x) = constant -x 2 /2,
which is obviously a concave function. Since the normal distribution is log concave, it
follows that for the normal distribution, 6(x) is monotone increasing.
Proposition 4 and Lemma 3 allow us to state the following.
Proposition 5. If the density function of the quality distribution of females is log concave,
then long run stationary equilibrium is unique.
In a recent study, Bagnoli and Bergstrom (1989) examine the log concavity of den-
sity functions, cumulative density functions, and their integrals for numerous common
probability distributions. Remark 2 reports some of these results.
Remark 2. The following probability distributions have log concave densities and hence
monotone increasing 6(x) functions. Uniform, normal, logistic, extreme value, chi-squared,
chi, exponential, and Laplace. The following probability distributions have log concave
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density functions for some but not all parameter values. Weibull, power function, gamma,
beta.
Log concavity of the density function is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for
6(x) to be monotone increasing. Bagnoli and Bergstrom (1989) show that the log normal
distribution and the Pareto distribution are examples of distribution functions which do not
have log concave density functions but do have log concave cumulative density functions
and monotone increasing 6(x).
Drawing on these result, we have the following.
Proposition 6. Long run stationary equilibrium is unique if the density function of the
distribution of female quality is of any of the following forms: Uniform, normal, logistic,
extreme value, chi-squared, chi, exponential, Laplace, log normal, and Pareto.
6. The Trajectory to Long-Run Equilibrium
If the population starts out in long run stationary equilibrium, it will remain there. But if
initially the population is not in long run stationary equilibrium, it will not immediately
jump to a stationary equilibrium. When the system does not start out in long run equi-
librium, the dynamics are complicated by the fact that in some time periods, females will
choose to delay their date of marriage because the supplies of available males and females
males may be more favorable to them in the second period of their lives than in the first.
A complete general characterization of the behavior of the system outside of long-run equi-
librium appears to be very difficult. Here we settle for a pair of general results, one for
each sex, and an example.
Proposition 1, which we proved earlier, is true whether or not the system is in long run
stationary equilibrium. This result informs us that the set of males who choose to wait
until Age 2 to marry is an "upper tail" of the distribution of males. While the behavior of
females is much more complicated and not fully described here, we do have the following
rather interesting general result.
Proposition T. In equilibrium, no female will ever marry a male of Age 2 whose quality
rank is higher than her own.
Proof: If in period t, some female marries a male of higher quality rank than her own,
then there will have to be some young female of higher quality who does not marry a male
of quality rank as high as her own in period t. This second female must, therefore, have
voluntarily postponed marriage. But if she is willing to postpone her marriage, she must
get a male whose quality exceeds that of her quality-match by at least cb. This means
that a third female of yet higher quality must be displaced one generation later. The
process would have to continue, with females of ever higher quality in later generations
being displaced. Eventually there would be no male sufficiently good to compensate the
best displaced female for waiting until Age 2. I
Finally, we present a special example which is simple enough so that we can work out
an exact solution for the pattern of marriage that starts out from a position off of the long
run equilibrium path and moves gradually toward long run equilibrium.
An Example
For each sex, "quality" is uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1]. Equal numbers
of males and females are born in each period. In the initial period, there are no unmarried
persons of Age 2 available from either sex. The utility cost of marrying at Age 2, rather
than at Age 1 is c < 1/2 for members of either sex. A person's desirability to members of
the opposite sex neither increases nor decreases between Ages 1 and 2.
In long run equilibrium, males of quality lower than 2c marry at Age 1, males of quality
higher than 2c marry at Age 2, and all females marry at Age 1. But this population will
not go all the way to long run equilibrium in a single step. If it did so, then no Age 1
males of quality y > 2c would marry and since there are no males of Age 2 available, any
female who marries in the first period would have to accept a random young male, whose
expected quality would be c. But by waiting until the next period when some high quality
Age 2 males become available, females of the highest quality could get spouses of nearly
quality 1. Since by assumption, 1 - 2c > 0, it must be that 1 - c > c, so some of the best
females will be better off waiting to marry at Age 2.
For this example, the pattern of ages at marriage converges to long run equilibrium
in a simple, but rather surprising way. The proportion of males who choose to marry at
Age 2 goes immediately to the equilibrium level and stays there. But females divide into
four groups. In each period after the first, an interval of females at the top of the quality
distribution marries at Age 1 to males of Age 2. An intermediate quality interval waits
until Age 2 to marry at which time they marry males of Age 2. An interval of females
just below these marries at Age 1 to males of Age 1. Finally at the bottom of the quality
distribution of females is an interval of females who are left without partners.
Let X i denote the set of females born in year t who marry at Age 1 to males of Age 2.
Let X? be the set of females born in year t who marry at Age 2 to males of Age 2, let Xt
be the set of females born in year t who marry at Age 2 to males of Age 1, let Xi be the
set of females born in year t who marry at Age 1 to males of Age 1 and let X be the set
of females born in year t who are left without mates. If initially there are no unmarried
persons of Age 2, each of these sets is an interval. These intervals take the following form:
X = (xI,1), X2 = (x 2,xi), Xi is empty, X= = (xt, xt) and Xi = (0, x=). Specifically, it
turns out that
xi = 2c +(1 - 2c)2 , 1
1 t
and x= (1 - 2c)Q.
This means that xi starts out at 1 in the first period. In the second period, x= moves half
way from 1 to the equilibrium value 2c and in each subsequent period again moves half way
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from its previous location to 2c. Notice also that for all t, x = xi_1 and that the length
of the interval X2 of females who marry at Age 2 is halved in every period and is being
squeezed asymptotically to 2c. The interval set Xt of females who are left unmatched is
being halved in every period. In the limit, the behavior of females approaches the long run
equilibrium in which all females of quality x > 2c belong to Xi and all females of quality
x < 2c belong to X4-
7. A Case of "Pure Luck"
So far, we have assumed that although others can't tell one young male's prospects from
another's, any male of Age I is, himself, fully informed about what his "quality" will be
at Age 2. Suppose, instead, that young males are as ignorant as everyone else about how
their fortunes will turn out and that each male's quality becomes publicly known when he
reaches Age 2. As in the previous model, let us suppose that the quality of each female is
public information when she reaches Age 1.
The shape of the distribution of quality of the females will determine whether males
will be "risk-averse" or "risk-loving" with respect to gambles for marriage partners. For
certain distributions, there is a relatively uninteresting equilibrium in which risk-aversion
predominates and all males and all females marry at Age 1. But for some distributions in
long-run equilibrium, some males may choose to "seek their fortunes" and wait to marry
at Age 2, after their economic luck has been resolved. The most fortunate members of this
group will be able marry the best young females. The least fortunate members of this group
will be less desirable than young males whose fortunes are still unknown. Accordingly, they
will be matched with the least desirable young females. The males who marry at Age 1
are matched to a set of females of intermediate quality. Since the tastes and prospects of
Age 1 males are assumed to be identical, it must be that in equilibrium the two strategies
yield equal expected utilities.
An Example
Suppose that the quality of females is distributed over the interval [0,1], where the
density of females of quality x is f(x). Let p be the fraction of the male population waits
to marry at Age 2. Half of those who marry at Age 2 will turn out to be of lower quality
and half will turn out to be of higher quality than the expected quality of a randomly
chosen young male. Females whose quality lies in the interval [0,g(p/2)] will marry males
of Age 2 who turned out to be of lower than average quality. Females of whose quality lies
in the interval [g(1 - p/2),1] will marry males of Age 2 who turned out to be of higher
than average quality. The remaining females will marry young males.
If a male marries at Age 1, he will get a random draw from the set of females whose
quality is between g(p/2) and g(1 - p/2). The expected quality of his mate will therefore
be
1 (-p/2)
/ zf(z)dz.1 -p Jg(p/2)
If a male marries at Age 2, then with probability 1/2 he will get a random draw from the
interval [0,g(p/2)] and with probability 1/2 he will get a random draw from the interval
[1 - g(p/2),1]. The expected quality of his mate will therefore be
1 (p/2)
1 / zf(z)dz + zf(z)dz 
.
Since at Age 1, all males view their prospects as equal, it must be that in equilibrium the
strategy of waiting until Age 2 to marry has the same expected utility as the strategy of
marrying at Age 1. Recalling that there is a cost of cb to a male of waiting until Age 2 to
marry, we have the equilibrium condition:
1 g(-p/2)










If the distribution function f() is specified, then the above equation can be solved for p.
Once p is known, the equilibrium is fully determined. We have computed explicit solutions
for two simple special cases.
Case A: Let f(y) = y2 /3. Then if c6 > 1/6, then in long run equilibrium, everyone
marries at Age 1. But if cb < 1/6, then in long run equilibrium, the fraction p of the male
population waits until Age 2 to marry, where p = 2- 12cb.
Case B: Let f(y) = y3/4. Then if c& > 1/4, then in long run equilibrium, everyone
marries at Age 1. If cb < 1/4, then in long run equilibrium, the fraction p of the male
population waits until Age 2 to marry, where p = 2 - 8cb.
In contrast to the case where males know their own quality at Age 1, this model predicts
that a male's eventual economic success will be uncorrelated with his age at marriage. But
like the earlier model, it predicts that in long run equilibrium, all females will marry young
and that the most desirable females will marry successful males of Age 2.
8. Concluding Remarks
In order to clarify the logic of an intergenerational "lemons" model, we have dealt in
stark oversimplification. We do not pretend to have captured all of the forces which lead
to a gender gap in age at first marriage. Nor have we modeled all the considerations that
are relevant for the type of explanation that we propose.
Certainly a better and more realistic model would have incomplete information about
the quality of young females as well as of young males. For members of either sex, more
information would become publicly available as they grow older. The rate at which the
relevant information appears might be slower for males than for females, but in societies
where females are allowed more varied economic roles, the relevant information about
females would appear more slowly than in traditional societies.
Our model should also be enriched to allow for the possibility that persons will differ
in inherited "nonhuman wealth" as well as in "human capital". The value of a person's
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nonhuman wealth can be quite readily assessed at an early age. Therefore we might expect
that heirs and heiresses, who can establish their desirability at an early age, would marry
earlier than persons of equal expected lifetime income whose wealth is mostly anticipated
earnings.
Though we will save detailed statistical testing for another paper, we have evidence
that suggests that we may be looking in the right direction. Our model predicts that
when males have private information about how successful they will be, those who marry
young will tend to be less prosperous in later years than those who marry at an older
age. According to the 1980 U.S. census,1 2 the fraction of males age 45-54 with annual
incomes below $10,000 was 35% for those who married before age 18, 27% for those who
married before age 20, and only 17.5% for those who first married between ages 21 and
29. Median income of persons who married before 18 was $14,500, median income of those
who married between 18 and 20 was $16,800, and median income of those who married
between 22 and 29 was $19,000.13
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Table 3. Mean Age at First Marriage-Caribbean, Central America, and South America
Country Men Women Difference between Sexes
Mean Age of Annual Chang Mean Age of Annual Chang In Age of Annual Rate
First Marriag 1950-1985 First Marriag 1950-1985 First Marriag of Change
Cuba 23.5 -.09 19.9 -.08 3.6 -.01
Dominican Republi 26.1 .02 19.7 .05 6.4 -.03
Haiti 27.3 -.04 23.8 .06 3.5 -.10
Trinidad 27.9 .05 22.3 .12 5.6 -.07
Costa Rica 25.1 -.03 22.2 .01 2.9 -.04
El Salvador 24.7 -.03 19.4 -.01 5.3 -.02
Guatemala 23.5 -.02 20.5 .06 3.0 -.08
Honduras 24.4 -.05 20.0 .16 4.4 -.21
Mexico 24.1 -.02 20.6 -.03 3.5 .01
Nicaragua 24.6 -.08 20.2 .01 4.4 -.09
Panama 25.0 .01 21.3 .10 3.7 -.09
Argentina 25.3 -.07 22.9 -.01 2.4 -.06
Bolivia 24.5 0.0 22.1 -.02 2.4 .02
Brazil 25.3 -.09 22.6 -.04 2.7 -.05
Chile 25.7 -.04 23.6 0.0 2.1 -.04
Colombia 25.9 -.04 22.6 .03 3.3 -.07
Ecuador 24.3 -.04 21.1 0.0 3.2 -.04
Paraguay 26.0 -.02 21.8 .03 4.2 -.05
Peru 25.7 .01 22.7 .05 3.0 -.04
Uruguay 25.4 -.13 22.4 -.03 3.0 -.10
Venezuela 24.8 -.05 21.2 .10 2.6 -.15
Sosnce:Pafterns of First Marriage: Timing and Prevalence, United Nations Department of International and
Social Affairs, Table 18, page 130.
Table 4. Mean Age at First Marriage-Africa
Country Men Women Difference between Sexes
Mean Age of Annual Chang Mean Age of Annual Chang In Age of Annual Rate
First Marriag 1950-1985 First Marriag 1950-1985 First Marriag of Change
Benin 24.9 0.0 18.3 .07 6.6 -.07
Central Afr. Rep 23.3 .04 18.4 .07 4.9 -.03
Congo 27.0 .13 21.9 .18 5.1 -.05
Ghana 26.9 .06 19.4 .15 7.5 -.09
Kenya 25.5 .08 20.3 .11 5.2 -.03
Mali 27.3 .05 16.4 .01 10.9 .04
Liberia 26.6 .03 19.4 .12 7.2 -.09
Mauritius 27.5 .06 23.8 .15 4.7 -.09
Mozambique 22.7 -.04 17.6 -.06 5.1 .02
Reunion 28.1 .03 25.8 .10 2.3 -.07
Senegal 28.3 .02 18.3 .05 10 -.03
South Africa 27.8 .02 25.7 .10 2.1 -.08
Togo 26.5 .07 17.6 .07 8.9 0.0
Tanzania 24.9 .07 19.1 .11 5.8 -.04
Zambia 25.1 .06 19.4 .11 5.7 -.05
1Time intervals vary from country to country depending on available data.
Source:Patterns of First Marriage: Taming and Prevalence, United Nations Department of International and
Social Affairs, Table 7, page 77.
Table 1. Mean Age at First Marriage-Asia and the Middle East
Country Males Females Difference between Sexes
Mean Age of Average Annual Mean Age of Average Annual In Age of Avg Annual
First Marriag Change 1950-198 First Marriage Change 1950-198 First Marriage Change
Brunei 26.1 .01 25.0 .20 1.1 -.19
Hong Kong 29.2 .02 26.6 .19 2.6 -. 17
Indonesia 24.8 .07 21.1 .13 3.7 -.06
Japan 29.5 .08 25.8 .04 3.7 .04
Korea 27.8 .11 24.7 .14 3.1 -.03
Malaysia 26.6 .07 23.5 .15 3.1 
-.08
Nepal 21.5 .07 17.9 .07 3.6 0.0
Philippines 25.3 .01 22.4 .01 2.9 0.0
Singapore 28.4 .10 26.2 .26 2.2 
-.16
Thailand 24.7 .01 22.7 .05 2.0 -.04
Bangladesh 23.9 -.01 16.7 .04 7.2 -.05
India 23.4 .09 18.7 .11 4.7 -.02
Pakistan 24.9 .09 19.8 .10 5.1 -.01
Sri Lanka 27.9 .03 24.4 .12 3.5 -.09
Algeria 25.3 -.02 21.0 .03 4.3 -.05
Cyprus 26.3 .11 24.2 .09 2.1 .02
Egypt 26.9 .05 21.4 .08 5.5 
-.03
Iraq2  25.2 -06 20.8 .01 4.4 -.07
Irana 24.2 -.07 19.7 .12 4.5 -.19
Israel 26.1 .02 23.5 .10 2.6 -.
08
Jordan 26.8 .10 22.8 .12 4.0 -.02
Kuwait 25.2 .01 22.4 .18 2.8 -.17
Morocco 27.2 .09 22.3 .17 4.9 -.08
Syria 25.7 .02 21.5 .09 4.2 -.
07
Tunisia 27.8 .02 24.3 .18 3.5 -.16
Turkey 23.6 .06 20.7 .07 2.9 -.01
' Time trends are from 1974-1981. 2 Time trends are from 1966-1977. 8 Time trends are fronm 1957-1977.
Source:Pat erns of First Marriage: Timing and Prevalence, United Nations Department of International 
and
Social Affairs, Tables 7 and 'fable 34, pages 77 and 173.
Table 2. Mean Age at First Marriage-North America, Oceania, and Europe
Country Males Females Difference between Sexes
Mean Age of Average Annual Mean Age of Average Annual In Age of Avg Annual
First Marriage Change 1950-198 First Marriage Change 1950-198 First Marriage Change
United States 25.2 .05 23.3 .08 1.9 -.03
Canada 25.2 0.0 23.1 .02 2.1 -.02
Australia 25.7 .01 23.5 .09 2.2 -.08
New Zealand 24.9 -.03 22.8 .02 2.1 -.05
Denmark 28.4 .06 25.6 .13 2.8 -.07
Finland 27.1 .04 24.6 .06 2.5 -.02
Norway 26.3 -.05 24.0 .03 2.3 -.08
Sweden 30.0 .10 27.8 .19 2.4 -.09
Ireland 24.4 -.23 23.4 -.11 1.0 -.12
England 25.4 -.02 23.1 .03 2.3 -.05
Austria 27.0 -.02 23.5 -.03 3.5 .01
Belgium 24.8 -.05 22.4 -.03 2.4 -.02
France 26.4 0.0 24.5 .05 1.9 -.05
West German 27.9 .01 23.6 -.03 4.3 .04
Luxembourg 26.2 -.08 23.1 -.05 3.1 -.03
Netherlands 26.2 -.04 23.2 -.05 3.0 .01
Switzerland 27.9 -.01 25.0 .01 2.9 -.02
Greece 27.6 -.07 22.5 -.11 5.1 .04
Italy 27.1 -.05 23.2 -.05 3.9 0.0
Portugal 24.7 -.08 22.1 -.08 2.6 0.0
Spain 26.0 -.10 23.1 -.11' 2.9 -.01
Bulgarial 24.5 .03 20.8 -.01 3.7 .04
Czechoslavaki 24.7 -.08 21.7 -.04 3.0 -.04
East Germany 25.4 -.01 21.7 -.07 3.7 .06
Hungary 24.8 -.06 21.0 -.05 3.8 -.01
Poland 25.9 .02 22.8 .04 3.1 -.02
gomania2  24.9 .04 21.1 .08 3.8 -.04
USSR3  24.2 0.0 21.8 .07 2.4 -.07
Yugoslavia 26.1 .07 22.2 0 3.9 .07
1'Time trends from 1956-1975. 2 Time trends from 1966-1977. 3 Time trends from 1979-1985.
Source:Patierns of First Marriage: Timing and Prevalence, United Nations Department of International and
Social Affairs, Table 44, page 223.
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